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Groundwater Rights in an
Uncertain Environment: Theoretical
Perspectives on the San Luis Valley
ABSTRACT
A costly dispute has been generated by a proposal to
establish new groundwater rights in the aquifer system underlying
Colorado's San Luis Valley for the purpose of transferring
groundwaterto Colorado'sFront Range cities. This paper compares
the insights of three theoretical perspectives on such disputes over
groundwaterrights. The authors examine the effects of the natureof
the resource on the definition, exercise, and defense of property rights
to groundwater. Evidence is drawnfrom the San Luis Valley case to
assess the utility of the theoretical perspectives in contributing to
understandingthe evolution of institutionsgoverning groundwater
use.

INTRODUCTION
The aridity and climatic variability of much of the western United
States have resulted in continuing competition for control of the region's
water resources. While the scarcity of western water makes it a potentially valuable commodity, variability of supply both directly diminishes the
value of any given water source and increases the cost of defining and
enforcing the rights of competing users. Surface water availability is
subject to significant natural variability as well as to the effects of
competing uses. Groundwater is often used where precipitation and
surface water sources are inadequate or unreliable, and its use provides
a form of insurance against the effects of climatic variability. Groundwater resources, however, are not immune from natural variability, and
groundwater use also entails competition among users. Uncontrolled
pumping by competing users of an aquifer may substantially reduce the
value of the resource over time.
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Center for Atmospheric Research is sponsored by the National Science Foundation.
" Director, Natural Resources Law Center, School of Law, University of Colorado,
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As the economy and demography of the western United States
have changed, growing urban and environmental water demands (e.g.,
minimum instream flows) increasingly compete with irrigators and other
traditional water users. The legal institutions and contractual agreements
that govern the allocation of water in the arid and semi-arid West have
evolved to manage competition for scarce water. Nevertheless, costly
conflicts occasionally arise. Are such conflicts the result of inadequate
institutions governing the allocation of groundwater, surface water or
both? Are they inherent in the nature of these resources or are they
simply a part of the continuing evolutionary process by which rights to
the use of these resources are defined, defended and exercised?
This paper compares insights on these questions, particularly as
they relate to groundwater resources, provided by three different
theoretical perspectives. The theoretical perspectives we examine are: 1)
an "optimal control" economics perspective which addresses the potential
contribution of privatization to the best use of a resource over time, 2) a
"transaction cost" perspective on the nature of property rights which
emphasizes the costs of defining and enforcing those rights, and 3) a
perspective derived from the work of Elinor Ostrom on the local
governance of common property resources which we call "the Ostrom
perspective." These differing theoretical perspectives, which we describe
in detail below, are used to analyze an ongoing conflict over groundwater
rights in the San Luis Valley in south-central Colorado (Figure 1).'
This paper uses the San Luis Valley case to explore the nature of
groundwater and how that nature affects the definition, exercise and
defense of groundwater rights. The paper next assesses the respective
contributions of the three theoretical perspectives to an understanding of
the evolution of institutions governing groundwater use.

1. The San Luis Valley is located in the upper Rio Grande Basin. It is bounded on the
west by the San Juan Mountains and on the east by the Sangre de Cristo Range. The Valley
has an average elevation of 7,500 feet and receives an average of 7 to 8 inches of
precipitation annually. Irrigated agriculture has a long history in the Valley, and despite a
relatively short growing season, it remains a major part of the Valley's economic base.
Livestock production is also important in the Valley. The Valley's primary crops are hay,
potatoes, and grain (Colorado State University Cooperative Extension, Colorado's Bountiful
San Luis Valley, undated). Consumptive water use by irrigated crops is estimated to be
approximately 1 million acre-feet per year. See HRS Water Consultants, Inc., San Luis Valley
Confined Aquifer Study (1987), G. Hearne & J. Dewey, Hydrological Analysis of the Rio
Grande Basin North of Embudo, New Mexico, Colorado and New Mexico (Water Resources
Investigation Report 864113, US. Geological Survey, 1988). With approximately 750,000
irrigated acres, the gross value of the Valley's crop production was $221 million in 1989. See
S. Schuff, High Stakes, 8 Colorado Rancher and Farmer (1 October 1990).
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The case in question resulted from an attempt by a private
company, American Water Development Incorporated (AWDI),z to
establish the right to drill wells into a system of hydrologically interconnected aquifers underlying the San Luis Valley for the purpose of
annually extracting up to 200,000 acre-feet of water. The company
proposed to export much of this water from the Valley by building a
pipeline over Poncha Pass, at the Valley's northern end. The water
would then be available for sale to Denver and other "Front Range"
Colorado cities along the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains.3 This
proposal has been vehemently opposed by the majority of San Luis
Valley residents as well as by state and federal agencies and environmental interest groups.4
The company's plans have been at least temporarily stalled by the
recent ruling of Judge Robert W. Ogburn of Colorado's Division 3 Water
Court. The judge ruled on 22 November 1991 that AWDI had failed to
demonstrate that the groundwater it would develop was "nontributary"
under Colorado law and thus could be developed as a matter of
ownership of the overlying land. This decision was reached quickly after
the end of six weeks of testimony in one of the most costly and hotly
contested cases in the Court's history.
While many of the Valley's residents and other opponents of the
proposed project are celebrating this decision as a victory, most realize
that water export plans are far from dead. In particular, the company's
last-minute decision to withdraw its claims for "tributary" groundwater
(i.e., hydrologically connected to surface water) has' left, those claims
available for consideration at a later date. The legal significance under
Colorado law of the distinction between tributary and nontributary
groundwater will be discussed below.

2. AWDI is a private water development firm incorporated in 1985 for the purpose of
acquiring the Baca Ranch in Colorado's San Luis Valley. See District Court, Water Division
3, Colorado, Case No. 86-CW-46 Concerning the Application for Water Rights of: American
Water Development Inc., The Baca Ranch Company, and the Baca Corporation, In Saguache
County-Deposition of D. Williams, Jr. (7 February 1990). AWDI's business is to assist
municipalities in eastern Colorado acquire water supplies suited to their specific needs. See
AWDI, Meeting the Needs of Colorado'sFront Range (submitted to L. Berkowitz, Metropolitan
Denver Water Authority, 1989).
3. The Metropolitan Denver Water Authority has recently indicated its willingness to pay
capital costs of up to $6,000 per acre-foot for reliable new supplies delivered into the Denver
system (letter from D. Shaffer, President of AWDI, to L Berkowitz, President, MDWA, 13
November 1989). The capital value of a reliable water right for agricultural use within the
San Luis Valley appears to be less than $500 per acre-foot. See D. Foster, Group Seeks
Diversityfor San Luis Economy, Rocky Mountain News (8 August 1990).
4. B. Scanlon, Truce Urged in Water Fight, Rocky Mountain News (19 August 1991).
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The controversy over AWDI's proposal is the most recent chapter
in a long history of conflict and litigation over water use in the San Luis
Valley.5 Furthermore, the possible resurrection of AWDI's plan may be
only one of many potential future challenges to the security of water
rights now used for irrigated agriculture in the Valley. A prolonged
drought or long-term climate change, for example, could reduce the
security of these rights and rekindle a long-standing interstate dispute
between Colorado, New Mexico and Texas regarding Colorado's water
delivery obligations under the Rio Grande Compact.6
The San Luis Valley case is not unique, but rather illustrative of
the costs that can be incurred in defining and enforcing water rights in
a complex, variable and interconnected 7 hydrologic system. Each of the
theoretical perspectives discussed below provides a different approach to
understanding, the nature of these costs, as well as their role in the San
Luis Valley case and in the evolution of institutions governing groundwater use and management in general.
GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER RIGHTS
The Nature of Groundwater Resources
Groundwater is extracted from underground water-bearing
geologic formations or "aquifers". Aquifers differ in their particular
characteristics. For example, some aquifers have negligible rates of
recharge, so that any use of water necessarily entails drawdown and
higher extraction costs for all future uses. Other aquifers may recharge
more rapidly, but the recharge rate may vary greatly from year to year
and may be difficult or impossible to measure accurately. Pressure heads
(which affect the cost of pumping) and aquifer transmissivity, which
describes the ease with which water moves within the aquifer, may vary
between aquifers as well as within a single aquifer. An aquifer may
consist of several hydrologically interconnected layers, each with different
water quality and other hydrologic properties. An aquifer may vary in
thickness and its areal extent may be difficult to determine. There may
be hydrologic connections to surface water bodies such that an aquifer

5. D. McFadden, Aspects of San Luis Valley Water in 1989, Administrative, Investigative and
Litigative, Water in the Valley: A 1989 Perspective on Water Supplies, Issues and Solutions
in the San Luis Valley, Colorado (Colorado Ground-Water Association, 1989).
6. The Rio Grande Compact governs the allocation of water from the Rio Grande River
among Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas.
7. Interconnections can occur between an aquifer and adjacent surface water sources or
between different layers in an aquifer separated by semi-permeable strata. Pressure
gradients determine the direction of movement of water within an interconnected system.
Waters and Water Rights §18.02 (R. Beck ed. 1991 ed.) [hereinafter Waters].
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may gain water from surface water seepage at certain points and lose
water to the surface at others. Discharge from an aquifer can take the
form of direct losses to evapotranspiration or contributions to stream
flows, with the rates and proportions of such discharge being dependent
on the water level in the aquifer and hence on aquifer pumping. In
addition, high water tables and surface contact points can support
wetlands.
Highly variable aquifer characteristics, as well as natural
variations in recharge and discharge rates, make it difficult and costly to
determine the effects of one party's use of groundwater on other users of
groundwater and on interconnected surface water systems.
Groundwater Rights
Difficulties in the definition and enforcement of groundwater
rights have arisen both from the "invisible" nature of the resource and
from the inevitable but difficult to define linkages among groundwater
users. Tarlock provides this observation:
It is difficult to assign exclusive rights to a resource when, for
physical reasons, one claimant's consumption inevitably interferes
with another's legitimate consumption. A groundwaterbasin is not
like a coal reserve which can be divided among different landowners;
groundwatermust be shared at all times by a large number of users.
One pumper's use affects both the quantity and. pressure rates
available to other pumpers.
In the early 1800s, when groundwater hydrology was viewed as
a nearly unfathomable mystery, English courts established the "absolute
ownership" principle by which ownership of land provided a nominally
absolute right to the development of any groundwater that could be
withdrawn from that land.9 The lack of any limits on withdrawal and
use of the resource meant that there was no liability for damages to other
groundwater users. The English principle became the foundation of early
American groundwater law.1"
As conflicts over the consequences of the absolute ownership rule
became more frequent, many American courts moved toward a
"reasonable use" standard. According to that standard each overlying
landowner is allowed to make reasonable use of the resource in view of
the similar rights of others." However, as long as the water is used on
8. A. Tarlock, Supplemental Groundwater Irrigation Law: From Capture to Sharing, 73
Kentucky L. Rev. 695 (1985), at 699.
9. Waters, supra note 7 at §21.02.
10. Id.
11. Id.,
at §23.01(b).
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the overlying land in a manner deemed by the courts to be reasonable
and beneficial (and not transported for use in another location), there is
essentially no limitation on the quantity of water withdrawn, and water
may be drained from underneath adjacent land without liability." Most
eastern states have adopted this general rule, as have the western states
of Arizona, Nebraska and Oklahoma.13
Another approach based on overlying land ownership is the
"correlative rights" doctrine developed by the California courts. 4 Under
this doctrine "[aill pumpers have rights of equal dignity. There is no
temporal priority among overlying pumpers, and overlying owners do
not have a right to the maintenance of the natural water table.""
However, if an aquifer is being depleted, overlying owners may be
required to reduce their use on a co-equal basis." If water is available
in excess of the needs of the overlying landowners, it may be transported
for use on non-overlying lands.1 '
Most western states apply the basic principles of prior
appropriation in allocating groundwater." Claimants typically acquire
water rights under a permit granted by the state authority, after such
authority determines that unappropriated water is available and no injury
to other water users will result." The permit application specifies the
quantity of water to be withdrawn (and/or the maximum rate of
withdrawal), the well location, and the purpose. and place of use.0 As
with surface water, seniority of the right establishes priority to withdraw
water in the event of shortage. However, an injured senior appropriator
must usually demonstrate well-to-well interference to enforce its priority,
and will not be protected in the use of an "inefficient" means of
diversion.2 ' Appropriation rights are better defined than other types of

12. Id.
13. D. Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Administration, 59 Nebraska L. Rev 917
(1980).
14. Waters, supra note 7 at §2.02(a).
15. A. Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources (1989), at 4-16.
16. T. Anderson, 0. Burt & D. Fractor, Privatizing Groundwater Basins: A Model and Its
Applications,in Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought (r. Anderson ed, the Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1983).
17. Id.
18. Tarlock states that Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming apply prior appropriation
principles to groundwater, supra note 15, at 6-3. Colorado applies prior appropriation rules
to "tributary" groundwater.
19. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. §46.15.065.
20. Waters, supra note 7 at §24.02(b)(1).
21. Tarlock, supra note 15 at §6.04 (3).
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groundwater rights but they, too, fall well short of setting out clear
guidelines for sorting out conflicts among competing uses.
Inadequate management of groundwater pumping under general
rules has led many states to authorize the use of special management
areas in which a state or management area authority establishes special
rules. Depending on the state, groundwater development in these areas
may be subject to permit requirements, well spacing requirements, well
construction standards, allocation preferences, limited pumping rates,
restriction on place of use, water use monitoring and reporting, and other
similar requirements.2
Historically, the law of surface water and groundwater developed
separately. Colorado is one of the few states to statutorily recognize the
hydrologic connection between groundwater and surface water and the
only state to define rights to develop certain groundwater dependent on
the effect on surface water.' Aquifers containing "tributary"
groundwater discharge to surface streams that support surface water
diversion rights.'4 Tributary groundwater is thus hydrologically
interconnected with surface water. Therefore, the State Engineer must
administer rights to tributary groundwater so as to prevent injury to
senior rights to surface water and groundwater.' In contrast,
"nontributary" groundwater is available for development by the
overlying landowner under a separate legal system. To qualify as
nontributary groundwater, withdrawal of the water over a 100-year
period must not cause an annual depletion to a natural stream of more
than 1/10 of one percent of its annual rate of withdrawal.' Since there
is often a considerable time-lag between the use of groundwater and its
effect on a surface stream, the law directs the State Engineer to restrict
pumping of tributary groundwater only where such a restriction will
avoid actual injury to senior surface rights.'
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
The Optimal Control Perspective
Economists have devoted considerable attention to the potential
effects of different property rights regimes on the allocation of

22. J. Bowman, Groundwater Management Areas in the United States, 116 J. Water Res.
Planning & Management 484 (1990)
23. Colorado Revised Statutes §37-92-102(a) & 103(11); §37-90-103(10.5) (1990)
24. Waters, supra note 7 at §20.05.
25. Tarlock, supra note 15 at §6.06 (1)(a).
26. Colorado Revised Statutes §37-90-103(10.5) (1990).
27. L. MacDonnell, Colorado'sLaw of "Underground Water": A Look at the South Platte Basin
and Beyond, 59 Univ. Colorado L. Rev. 579 (1988).
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groundwater.' Much of this literature has relied on "optimal control"
modeling to define the allocation of groundwater use over time that
would maximize the net present value of the resource. This literature
identifies circumstances under which the actual time-path of water
extraction from both recharging and non-recharging aquifers will diverge
from that considered to be economically optimal. In general, it suggests
the possibility of faster than optimal depletion where individual water
rights are inadequately delimited. °
This literature has made valuable contributions to clarifying the
nature of the problems posed by uncontrolled access to a common aquifer
and to identifying necessary elements for the efficient operation of a
regime of privatized groundwater rights. For example, Gisser and
Sanchez 3' showed that the practical significance of the problem of faster
than optimal depletion depends upon the size of the aquifer relative to
demand for the water. They found that there may be no appreciable
difference between competitive (no-control) and "optimally controlled"32
rates of pumping where the aquifer is large relative to demand which, in
turn, is limited either by a restrictive definition of rights, or by the high
cost of transporting the water for use elsewhere. Gisseru used this
finding to argue that quantified individual rights defined on the basis of
consumptive use, as is the case in parts of New Mexico 4, can come close
to achieving an optimal time-path of water use, particularly in aquifers
where natural recharge and discharge are negligible. He notes, however,
that some groundwater rights may eventually have to be retired in order
to achieve an efficient steady-state or safe-yield in a recharging aquifer.

28. For example, see E. Bagley, Water Rights Law and Public Policies Relating to Ground
Water 'Mining' in the Southwestern States, 4 J.Law & Economics 144 (1961); 0. Burt, Economic
Control of Groundwater Reserves, 48 J. Farm Economics 632 (1966); G. Brown, An Optimal
Program for Managing Common Property Resources with Congestion Externalities, 82 J. Political
Economy 163 (1974); V. Smith, Water Deeds: A Proposed Solution to the Water Valuation
Problem, 26 Arizona Rev. 7 (1977); M. Gisser, Groundwater: Focusing on the Real Issue, 91 J.
Political Economy 1001 (1983); supra note 16.
29. For a general exposition of optimal control models see M. Intriligator, Mathematical
Optimization and Economic Theory (Prentice-Hall, 1971).
30. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 28.
31. M. Gisser & D. Sanchez, Competition versus Optimal Control in GroundwaterPumping,
4 Water Resources Research 638 (1980).
32. An optimal control model involves determining the optimal time-path of extraction
that will maximize the net present value of the use of a dynamic resource. For a renewable
resource such as a recharging aquifer, the optimal rate of extraction ultimately converges
to a steady state where the rate of inflow (both natural and return flow) equals the rate of
natural outflow plus extractions.
33. Gisser, supra note 28.
34. Id. at 1012-1015.
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The type of quantification considered by Gisser is simply a
limitation on annual consumptive use without explicit assignment of
rights to the actual stock of water in the aquifer. Gisser notes that under
such a regime, there is no assurance that aggregate demand has been
fixed at an optimal level. In particular, he notes the possibility that the
net present value of the resource might be increased by allowing an
entrant to establish'a new groundwater right rather than being required
to purchase an existing right. Because the new user would increase the
aggregate demand, the rate of drawdown would accelerate. This would
impose increased costs on all prior users. However, if the net present
value of the new use exceeded the costs imposed on prior users, the
gains to the newcomer would be sufficiently large to allow potential
compensation to existing users. Gisser proposes allowing existing holders
of quantified groundwater rights to bargain with potential new users to
establish a mutually acceptable entry fee to be paid to the existing users.
Such a system would foster movement toward an optimal aggregate level
of demand. He argues that if such a system were ever established,
conservancy districts could act as bargaining agents for existing users.3'
In addition, if drawdown is already perceived to be too rapid, these
districts could adjust the level of aggregate demand downward by
making assessments for the purpose of purchasing existing groundwater
rights for retirement.'
Others have carried the idea of quantified individual
groundwater rights further. Smith' proposed that individual rights
could be defined as being composed of two components: a proportion
of the long-run average net natural recharge and a share of the total
recoverable volume of water in the aquifer.'
Shares might be
determined either on the basis of use during some base period or on the
basis of ownership of land overlying the aquifer. Individual pumping
would then be metered and the individual's stock would be adjusted
annually by subtracting the amount used and by adding the appropriate
share of estimated net natural recharge, which would vary from year to

year.
Anderson et al.- noted that Smith's proposal would eliminate
externalities, specifically the problem of premature depletion, only in a
very simple aquifer where pumping costs are zero (regardless of the
volume of water in storage) and where the aquifer has smooth sides and
a flat bottom so that it is as thick at its perimeter as it is at the center.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1022.
Smith, supra note 28.
Id. at 8.
Anderson et al., supra note 16.
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They argue that a more realistic depiction of an aquifer would include
pumping costs that increase with aggregate use.'4 The aquifer is also
likely to be thicker in the middle so that as the aquifer is drawn down,
individuals located at the perimeter may lose access to the stock of water
regardless of their own conservation efforts. 41 Given these complications,
they argue that the stock portion of individual rights should be calculated
by first estimating the ultimate steady-state level of the stock of
groundwater, -*,from an optimal control model and then assigning stock
rights only to the difference between and the current stock, assuming
that the latter is larger. While they acknowledge that such a
quantification scheme would not be perfect, in that it would not eliminate
such problems as the effects of pumping on the rights of parties at the
perimeter of the aquifer, they argue that it would greatly reduce the
problem of over-extraction. They also argue that by placing decisions in
private hands, the proposed system would reduce information
requirements relative to any attempt by a centralized bureaucracy to
impose optimal-control management.'
In addition to these proposed benefits, the proponents of fully
quantified individual groundwater rights argue that the transfer of water
to more highly valued uses would be facilitated by quantification,
particularly where rights are defined on the basis of consumptive use.
They argue that such clear quantification would largely eliminate the
adverse hydrologic effects of transfers on other rights.'
Among the insights that can be gained from this literature is the
point that where demand is large and/or growing relative to the size of
the resource, some form of exclusivity or limitation on aggregate
withdrawals is likely to be required to prevent depletion at a rate faster
than would be considered optimal by the current generation of users. In
addition, Gisser" notes that the preferences of the current generation
regarding the optimal rate of depletion may not adequately reflect the
interests of future generations. Although he does not develop this
suggestion, it implies that full privatization may not be socially optimal
and that some reservation of groundwater stocks for future use may be
desirable.
The work of Anderson and his co-authors suggests that in order
to quantify individual groundwater rights in a manner that would
eliminate most externalities, reliable information would be required on
net natural recharge, the stock of water in place, the effects of changes in
_*

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 240.
Id.
Id. at 241.
Gisser, supra note 28 at 1012-1015; Anderson et al., supra note 16 at 238.
Gisser, supra note 28.
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the groundwater stock on pumping costs and rates of return flow from
alternate uses. In addition, to estimate x*, the optimal stock of
groundwater at steady state, for the purpose of determining the portion
of the total stock that should be privatized, regulators would need to
accurately estimate current and future demand for the water, although
Anderson et al. argue that adjustments could be made later as better
information becomes available. It should be noted that information on
each of these elements may be difficult and costly to obtain. Nevertheless,
Anderson et al. assert that "... . where water is scarce, these costs are not
However,
likely to be the constraints on efficient property rights."
they provide little empirical support for that assertion. The literature
based on optimal control theory generally does not directly consider the
costs of gathering physical data and market information nor other
transaction costs in the evaluation of the various quantification proposals.
Thus, while this literature emphasizes the benefits of carefully defining
groundwater rights, less attention has been given to the question of how
such a system might be established and to the costs that might be
encountered in the process.
The Transaction Cost Perspective
Recent theoretical work on the nature of property rights makes
the cost of information and other transaction costs an explicit part of the
analysis. This emerging field of economic thought focuses on the costs of
defining, exercising and enforcing property rights in the presence of
continuous competition to capture the stream of benefits that can be
generated by valuable assets such as scarce natural resources.* This
literature suggests that fully exclusive private property rights are much
rarer than is commonly supposed. Barzel, for example, argues that it is
important to recognize that property rights are not absolute nor are they
determined exclusively by law, since:
[tihe rights people have over assets (including themselves and
other people) are not constant; they are a function of their own
direct efforts at protection, of other people's capture attempts
and of government protection.... rights are never complete,

45. Anderson et al., supra note 16 at 236.
46. See, for example, R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Economics 1 (1960);
A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II Politico 816 (1965); S. Cheung, The

Structure of a Contractand the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.Law & Economics 49
(1970); 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (The Free Press, 1985); Y.
Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1989); T.
Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1990); D.
Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 Research in Law & Economics 1 (1991).
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because people will never find it worthwhile to gain the entire
potential of 'their' assets.47
Assets can be seen as having multiple dimensions, the rights to
which may be owned by different parties. In addition, since the cost of
defining and enforcing rights will vary from one dimension of an asset
to the next, rights with respect to one dimension may be more securely
defined and enforced than rights to other dimensions of the same asset.
The dimensions of an asset that are not effectively defended as private
property lie in the public domain, and their value is vulnerable to capture
by parties other than the nominal owner.
Proponents of this theoretical perspective view property rights as
molded by transaction costs which are defined as the costs of capturing,
enforcing and transferring such rights. Where measurement is costly and
where the value that an individual can derive from an asset is affected
both by natural variability and by the actions of other individuals, the
enforcement of exclusive individual rights becomes especially difficult.
In such circumstances, competing efforts to capture the potential value of
a resource may tend to dissipate that value.'
The creation of rules of access and enforcement mechanisms can
reduce this dissipation. Therefore, a question of central interest to the
under what circumstances will
"transaction cost" theorists is:
self-interested individuals cooperate to create such rules and
mechanisms? The transaction cost approach suggests that as the potential
value of a resource increases, there will be increased efforts to capture the
value of certain dimensions of the resource to which property rights are
not already clearly defined and enforced. Where these efforts lead
depends upon how costly it is to organize to alter rules of access and to
enforce them, and whether or not any party has a comparative advantage
in exerting control over the resource. If such an advantage exists, its
possessor may become the effective owner of the resource.49 In the
absence of such a "natural" owner, increased dissipation of value can be
expected where the costs of organization, rulemaking and enforcement
are prohibitive. Conversely, more carefully delineated rules of access can
be expected where such actions are not prohibitively costly. A change in
circumstances, such as a change in political system or an improvement
in measurement technology, can change the relative likelihood of these
alternate outcomes."

47.
48.
49.
50.

Barzel, supra note 46 at 2.
Barzel, supra note 46 at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 114.
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Groundwater resources fit the description of a resource for which
it is difficult to define and enforce individual rights. The amount of water
available and the pressure head fluctuate with both naturally varying
conditions and with use, and it is often costly to measure the relative
magnitude of these influences. Thus, the transaction cost perspective
would predict that as demand for groundwater increases, greater efforts
will likely be made to more carefully delineate individual rights, but this
may also be coupled with efforts to increase joint or central
decision-making authority over some aspects of the aquifer's use as a
means of economizing on measurement and enforcement costs.51
The Ostrom Perspective
Elinor Ostrom's work on the governance of common property
resources s is closely related to the transaction cost approach. Ostrom
addresses the questions of how and under what circumstances parties
making use of a common property resource will cooperate to devise and
enforce rules of access in order to avoid "the tragedy of the commons."
Ostrom begins by noting that much previous theoretical work has
concluded that only privatization or central governmental control could
eliminate tendencies toward overexploitation and depletion of resources
held in common. She argues that contrary to the predictions of simple
game-theoretic models, there are many empirical examples of stable and
well-functioning systems for the self-governance of commonly owned
resources. She notes, however, that such success stories are by no means
universal. The question of interest thus becomes: what accounts for the
difference? Why does effective self-governance arise in some situations
but not in others?
Ostrom takes an empirical approach to addressing this issue. Her
analysis is confined to small scale resource systems generating a flow of
resource units extracted by multiple appropriators, where each
individual's use reduces the availability of resource units to others.' She
defines such a system as a "common property resource" (CPR) if the
users maintain joint access rather than partitioning the resource into
discrete privatized holdings. ' She argues that joint access is likely in

51. Id. at 72.
52. E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
53. Id. at 31.
54. Note that the transaction cost perspective, as outlined above, implies that there may
not be a black-and-white distinction between private property and common property.
Nominally private assets may have some dimensions from which other parties cannot be
excluded and others for which substantial costs may be undertaken to maintain exclusive
control. Ostrom (Id.) also notes that resource units, once extracted from a CPR, are likely to
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circumstances where the resource is large and indivisible and/or where
the costs of excluding appropriators from its use or from enjoying the
benefits of system improvements are high relative to the value of the flow
of resource units that the system may be capable of generating.' She
notes that a CPR may be either a natural system such as a fishery or a
forest or a produced system such as a system of irrigation canals and
diversion works.
Ostrom compares actual cases in which local self-governance is
(a) robust and well-functioning, (b) functioning but fragile, or (c)
non-existent despite evidence of significant resource damage as a result
of uncontrolled access. This comparison leads Ostrom to conclude that a
variety of factors affect a local community's ability to achieve effective
joint governance of a CPR. She finds the broad institutional setting within
which the local community operates to be important, particularly whether
or not higher levels of government recognize the authority of the local
community to engage in self-regulation of their resource use. Her analysis
thus tends to focus on the importance of the rules that govern how
collective decisions are made. She argues that the relative success of
efforts to manage CPRs hinges on the ability of the collective
decisionmaking process to devise operational rules appropriate to
particular circumstances and to respond as those circumstances change.
Other important factors include the nature of the resource itself,
the level of demand for resource units, the homogeneity of the
community of appropriators and the strength of their ties to the locality.
She argues that where there are enduring patterns of mutual
interdependence on multiple levels, individuals may internalize an
aversion to cheating on the rules governing use of the CPR. This would
tend to reduce costs of monitoring and enforcement.
Ostrom argues that the process of institutional change may best
be understood as driven by changes in such factors, since they affect the
expected benefits and costs of alternative sets of rules governing the use
of a CPR. She notes, for example, cases in which rules that once
adequately restricted use of a CPR broke down when a central regime
withdrew support for the local rules or where there was a sudden
increase in the market value of resource units or an influx of
appropriators from outside the local community.' Elements found by
Ostrom to be common to the robust self-governing institutions include
the effective exclusion of outsiders, rules tailored to specific localized
conditions, and the presence of conflict resolution mechanisms. Ostrom

be treated as the private property of the appropriators.
,55. Id. at 30-32.
56. Id. at 149-167, 173-178.
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also argues that the flexibility of resource-governing institutions to deal
with new opportunities and problems as they arise is particularly
important for the long-term sustainability of a CPR.
Ostrom emphasizes the importance of costly and incomplete
information. She notes that particular institutional choices such as strict
limitations on the time of use or requiring all resource units to be
marketed at a central point can reduce the cost of acquiring information
about the state of the resource as well as economize on the cost of
monitoring the actions of the users and enforcing rules of access.
Among the "robust" cases examined by Ostrom are some aquifers
in southern California. She found that despite considerable heterogeneity
of interests among the groundwater users, locally negotiated water-rights
settlements in the Raymond, West and Central Basins near Los Angeles
had succeeded in stabilizing those aquifers and preventing further
saltwater intrusion. These settlements were reached by locally driven,
incremental processes that were promoted by a supportive political
environment. The settlements involved quantifying the rights of the
appropriators on the basis of agreed proportional cutbacks relative to
their previous use. Once quantified, these rights became transferable, and
active water markets now exist in these basins. However, Ostrom argues
that this system is not equivalent to full "privatization" because: "[n]o
one 'owns' the basins themselves. The basins are managed by a
polycentric set of limited-purpose governmental enterprises whose
governance includes active participation by private water companies and
voluntary producer associations. This system is neither centrally owned
nor centrally regulated.""7 Active recharge programs are among the
activities that are collectively managed in these basins.
Summary and Implications
Each of the perspectives discussed above emphasizes slightly>
different aspects of the relationship between groundwater allocation and
property rights. In general, proponents of all three perspectives appear
to agree that an increase in demand for groundwater from the entry of
new users may impose additional costs on existing users. The ability of
existing users to prevent the imposition of these costs depends upon the
definition and enforcement of their rights. Furthermore, advocates of each
perspective acknowledge that the difficult problems of groundwater
management stem from the inherent hydrologic interdependencies
between groundwater users. That is, if the water underlying one
individual's property is hydraulically connected to the water underlying
the property of other parties, each party's use may affect the availability

57. Id. at 136.
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of water to others. Such impacts may include a decrease in water table
elevations, ranging from a few inches to several feet, and/or a change in
water quality.
The perspectives differ in their assessment of the importance of
transaction costs. Anderson and his co-authors explicitly argue that too
much attention has been given to the possible importance of transaction
costs as a source of groundwater conflicts and that these costs should not
bar effective privatization in water-scarce areas." Other proponents of
privatization from the optimal control perspective also appear to believe
that transaction costs will not be important, as these researchers do not
explicitly incorporate such costs in their analyses. If this is correct, it
implies that the privatization schemes they envision will readily be
adopted whenever water becomes sufficiently scarce and valuable.
However, proponents of privatization working from the optimal control
perspective argue that major institutional barriers to privatization exist,
but they do not explicitly identify these as arising from transaction costs.
Thus, costly disputes and dissipation of the value of the resource can
occur within their framework, but they are seen as the result of
inadequate institutions. As such, these problems may be resolved by
policy changes, and therefore much of this optimal control-based
literature is aimed at proposing such changes.
The other two perspectives summarized above emphasize the
likely importance of transaction costs for groundwater allocation,
particularly where the resource is complex and subject to natural
variability. In cases where the costs of better defining individual rights
are high, both the transaction cost perspective and the work of Ostrom
suggest that costly disputes and increased dissipation of value are likely
to occur as demand for a jointly-used resource increases. Both of these
approaches are somewhat less sanguine than the optimal control
perspective about the possibility of easy policy solutions, although
Ostrom attempts to identify the characteristics of successful strategies for
the management of CPRs, with the apparent goal of providing policy
guidance.
To theorists adhering to the transaction cost perspective, the
problems of costly disputes and value dissipation are likely to be viewed
as part of the natural evolution of property rights as demand for the
resource increases over time. An implication of this theoretical work is
that when the potential value of a resource increases, greater efforts will
58. Anderson et al., supra note 16 at 236. However, Anderson argues that transaction
costs may have significant impacts on water allocation in other situations. See for example,
T. Anderson & R. Johnson, The Problem of Instream Flows, 24 Economic Inquiry 535 (1986);
T. Anderson, Introduction: The Water Crisisand the New Resource Economics, in Water Rights:
Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the Environment (r. Anderson ed, 1983).
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be devoted to attempting to capture that value. Not only may parties who
have not previously made use of the resource attempt to assert a claim,
but existing users can be expected to increase their efforts to protect their
own rights. The policy recommendations derived from the transaction
cost literature would therefore likely focus on devising ways to
economize on costs generated by this competitive process.
The transaction cost perspective emphasizes the potential costliness
of acquiring information about the nature of a resource and about the
effects of one party's actions on others. Therefore, aquifer variability is
particularly important to transaction cost theorists, as measurement and
enforcement costs tend to increase with such variability.
Ostrom's perspective also emphasizes the importance of transaction
costs and the effects of resource variability on those costs. In her analysis,
resource variability and uncertainty about the state of the resource create
problems regardless of the particular rules in place governing its use.
Ostrom finds that the operational rules currently in place may be less
important to the long-term viability of a CPR than the ability of users to
(1) effectively monitor the resource, (2) gather information about its use
and sensitivities, and (3) alter the rules governing use in response to new
information.
Ostrom suggests that the identity of the players is also important,
since personal trust and mutual interdependence within a cohesive
community may lower the cost of enforcing individual rights to a shared
resource. This argument implies that where these elements are missing,
costly disputes are more likely.
AWDI AND THE SAN LUIS VALLEY
This section describes the sources and evolution of an ongoing
conflict over the groundwater resources of the San Luis Valley. Each of
the perspectives described above contributes to an understanding of this
conflict. However, since much of the conflict revolves around disagreements over hydrologic "facts", and since it is costly to obtain the data
necessary to resolve such disagreements, the perspectives that emphasize
the importance of transaction costs are particularly relevant.
In 1986, AWDI filed its plan to drill wells into a deep aquifer
underlying the company's extensive landholdings in the San Luis Valley
of southern Colorado, and to export groundwater to growing cities along
the dry eastern slope of Colorado's Rocky Mountains (the Colorado Front
Range). These plans for AWDI's "Baca Project" were encouraged by
AWDI's expectations that urban water agencies would purchase this
water at a price that would make the project a profitable venture.
Forecasts of rapid population growth in the Denver metropolitan area
and in other Front Range cities, and increasing environmental constraints
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on the development of new surface water reservoirs," undoubtedly
enhanced the investors' profit expectations. AWDI based its application
for the necessary water rights on hydrologic studies suggesting that the
water-bearing formations underlying the Valley contain an enormous
volume of water scarcely tapped by present groundwater users.'
The aquifer system in the San Luis Valley is multilayered
(Figure 2). A shallow "unconfined" aquifer receives substantial recharge
from surface streams and return flow from the Valley's surface water
irrigation system.6' This aquifer has also been heavily tapped for
irrigation, particularly on the western side of the Valley, where its level
appears to be closely connected to the flow of the Rio Grande.' 2 The
extreme seasonality of streamflows and the relative lack of surface water
reservoirs on the Upper Rio Grande system historically resulted in
substantial reliance on sub-irrigation techniques.' This involved heavy
applications of surface water on irrigated land when it was available in
the spring to raise the water table into the root zone. 4 Over the years,
sub-irrigation with surface water has increasingly been supplemented
with and replaced by irrigation from wells, allowing larger crop acreages
to be carried through the late summer when surface water is unavailable.'s Now, some of the Valley's irrigation districts and ditch companies encourage their members to divert their surface water into recharge
pits when it is unneeded for their crops in order to recharge the
unconfined aquifer and maintain a high water table.' Conjunctive use
of variable surface water supplies and closely interconnected groundwater is thus a significant feature of the current water-use regime in the
Valley. The widely used system of sub-irrigation supplemented with
groundwater use is sensitive to climatic variability. When coupled with
59. S. Rhodes, K. Miller & L. MacDonnell, Institutional Response to Climate Change: Water
Provider Organizations in the Denver Metropolitan Region, 28 Water Resources Research 11

(1992).
60. AWDI, The Baca Project: Background and Technical Consultants (American Water
Development, Inc., 1991).
61. W. Powell, Ground-Water Resources of the San Luis Valley, Colorado (Geological
Survey Water-Supply Paper 1379, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1958), at 61-70.
62. Id. at 56, 69-70.
63. J. Helgren, S. Smolnik and E.Richardson, Artificial Recharge in the Alamosa-La Jara
Irrigation System, Water in the Valley: A 1989 Perspective on Water Supplies, Issues and
Solutions in the San Luis Valley, Colorado (Colorado Ground-Water Association, 1989), at
146-149.
64. McFadden, supra note 5 at 111-112; Powell, supra note,61 at 45.
65. G. Heame & J. Dewey, Hydrologic Analysis of the Rio Grande Basin North of
Embudo, New Mexico, Colorado and New Mexico (Water Resources Investigations Report
86-4113, U.S. Geological Survey, 1988).
66. Personal communication, David Robbins, counsel for Rio Grande Water Conservation
District, 29 January 1992.
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the pattern of restricting surface water use to meet interstate compact
obligations, variable runoff leads to interannual variability in the use of
groundwater, in recharge rates and in the level of the water table in the
unconfined aquifer.
A series of blue clay layers separates the unconfined aquifer from
a deeper "confined" aquifer, which consists of several layers, each at least
partially separated from the others by confining beds.6' There are
numerous small domestic and stock-water wells and some large capacity
irrigation wells in the confined aquifer, many of which are under
sufficient artesian pressure to flow to the surface.' There are hydrologic
connections between the shallow and deep aquifers, although the extent
of these connections is subject to dispute.
Only part of this aquifer system is thought to be hydrologically
connected to the Rio Grande River.' Near Crestone, there is an area
referred to as the "Closed Basin" where surface streams and the
unconfined aquifer are hydrologically separated from the Rio Grande
Basin by a surface divide and a subsurface barrier. The latter takes the
form of a pressure gradient that may be an artifact of the long history of
irrigation with surface water on the alluvial fan of the Rio Grande.70
While irrigation ditches bring water from the Rio Grande" into the
Closed Basin, there is currently no significant return flow to the Rio
Grande. Instead, the only discharge from the Closed Basin occurs through
evapotranspiration from crops and natural vegetation and evaporation
from soil and water surfaces.'
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, drainage water
from surface water irrigation operations, as well as upward leakage from
numerous uncased wells penetrating the deep artesian aquifer, caused the
water table in the Closed Basin area to rise to such an extent that much
of the land in the area became waterlogged or salinized, and thus
unsuitable for agriculture. 3 Furthermore, some of the lakes and extensive wetlands in the area were created and are now maintained by the
contribution of irrigation return flow to the high water table.' AWDI
has proposed to drill its wells into the deep aquifer in the Closed Basin
area.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Hearne and Dewey, supra note 65.
Heame and Dewey, supranote 65 at 81; Powell supra note 61 at 25-29.
Heame and Dewey, supra note 65 at 42.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Powell, supra note 61 at 56-57.
McFadden, supm note 5 at 112.
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The groundwater resources of the San Luis Valley have long been
recognized as valuable. Before the turn of the century, more than 2,000
artesian wells had been developed in the Valley.75 A major drought in
the 1950s prompted another wave of groundwater development,
primarily involving large-capacity wells drawing water for irrigation from
the confined aquifer.' At that time there was no state regulation of
groundwater development.
In 1957, the Colorado legislature required that permits for new
wells be obtained from the state engineer." In 1965, the legislature
directed the State Engineer to administer rights to tributary groundwater
within the surface water priority system." In response to a Colorado
Supreme Court decision requiring demonstration of material injury to
senior surface water rights before the state engineer can regulate tributary
groundwater rights,' the legislature included several provisions in the
1969 Water Right Determination and Administration Act' aimed at
promoting groundwater uses that will cause no injury to senior surface
water rights.81
Armed with this new authority, the state engineer in 1972
stopped issuing permits for new appropriations from the San Luis Valley
confined aquifer in order to help ensure compliance with the Rio Grande
Compact.1 A series of low-water years in the 1950s and the effects of a
subsequent rapid increase in groundwater use caused Colorado to violate
its delivery obligations under the Rio Grande Compact.' In 1966, Texas
and New Mexico brought suit against Colorado in the U.S. Supreme
Court for the accumulated underdelivery of 944,000 acre-feet. This
resulted in a stipulated agreement in 1968 by which Colorado committed
to curtail water uses as necessary to achieve its delivery obligation.' As
a result, the state engineer began limiting surface water diversions from
the Rio Grande and its tributaries. Believing that groundwater withdrawals from both the confined and unconfined aquifers affected flows in the
Rio Grande, the State Engineer also developed proposed rules in 1975
calling for a phasing out of the large-capacity wells in the San Luis Valley
75. Alamosa La Jara Water Users Protection Association v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo.

1983).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Heame and Dewey, supra note 65 at 74, 76-77.
Ground Water Law of 1957, 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 289 §5.
Act of May 3, 1965, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 318, §1,
Felihauer v. People, 167 320, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
Colorado Revised Statutes, §37-92-101 et seq. (1990).
MacDonnell, supra note 27 at 588.
Rio Grande Compact, P.L. No. 96, 53 Stat. 785 (1939); Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-66-101

(1990).
83. McFadden, supra note 5.
84. Texas v. Colorado, 391 US. 901 (1968).
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over a five-year period, unless these wells could be operated without
injury to senior surface rights. While the Colorado Supreme Court
eventually upheld these regulations with some modifications in 1983,6
the state engineer has never implemented them.
AWDI filed its application for water rights with the Division 3
Water Court in Alamosa on 31 December 1986.6 It initially proposed
to withdraw 200,000 acre-feet of water annually from 112 large-capacity
wells located on lands that it owns within the Closed Basin. The
proposed uses of the water included irrigation in the Valley, as well as
municipal, industrial and other uses outside the basin.'
AWDI based its claim for water on four separate legal theories.
One was that its water rights arose from Spanish and Mexican law
because the Baca Ranch, which it owns, derived from a Spanish land
grant.'6 If so, then AWDI would have the right to absolute and
undiminished use of all groundwater that it could develop with wells
located on the ranch. Another claim stated that an act of Congress in 1860
which authorized the selection of the Baca Ranch as replacement for
lands granted under Mexican law in New Mexico removed this land from
public domain status and thus gave its owner an absolute right to the
underlying groundwater. The Water Court dismissed these claims in
1990.
In addition, AWDI argued in the alternative that its claims should
be supported on the basis of appropriation as tributary groundwater, or
by Virtue of its overlying land ownership as nontributary groundwater.
In an amended application filed in 1990, AWDI added an additional basis
that included the implementation of measures necessary to offset any
injury associated with its development of tributary groundwater.
However, AWDI withdrew its tributary groundwater claims at a
conference immediately preceding the trial in 1991. Thus, the trial focused
specifically on the claim for nontributary groundwater, which requires
AWDI to show that the groundwater it proposes to extract is so remotely
connected to surface water that its development would have only a
negligible effect on surface flows in a 100-year period of withdrawals.
In 1990, AWDI amended its application in several respects. First,
it increased the number of wells from 112 to 132. It continued its ultimate
claim to withdraw 200,000 acre-feet of water per year, but proposed a
Phase I during which withdrawals would be limited to 60,000 acre-feet

85. See supra note 77.
86. AWDI, Concerningthe Applicationfor Water Rights of: American Water Development, Inc.,
the Baca Ranch Company, the Baca Corporation, in Saguache County (District Court, Water
Division 3, Alamosa, Colorado, Case 86CW46, 1986).
87. Id.
88. See supra note 75 for material in this and the following two paragraphs.
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per year. Approximately half of that water would be used to irrigate
10,000 acres of land in the San Luis Valley. The other 30,000 acre-feet
would be exported to cities along the Front Range of Colorado.
At the time of trial, approximately 80 individuals, water-user
organizations, and state and federal agencies had entered this suit as
objectors. Colorado law requires owners of water rights to take an active
role in protecting their rights against possible injury from prospective
new developments and from the transfer of existing rights to new uses. 9
The party proposing the new development or the changed use carries the
burden of proving non-injury," but objectors nonetheless must present
evidence of injury if they wish to protect their rights.
The central dispute at the six-week trial in the fall of 1991 was
whether AWDI's proposed groundwater withdrawals would deplete
flows in any of the surface streams in the Valley. AWDI argued that the
streams in the Closed Basin are not hydrologically connected to any
underlying aquifer. In support of its application, AWDI argued that the
vast quantities of water available and the structure of the underlying
geologic formations would assure that its groundwater withdrawals
would not affect surface flows." In particular, it argued that major
faulting in the deeper formations causes water to move vertically rather
than horizontally.' Its pumping would tend to draw water from above
and below, rather than laterally. Moreover, AWDI argued that while
surface streams in the Closed Basin lose water to the unconfined aquifer,
the groundwater is neither a source of recharge to any stream, nor do
changes in its level affect stream losses. However, in its opinion issued
10 February 1992, the Division 3 Water Court found that the groundwater
proposed for development by AWDI was tributary, since its withdrawal
would deplete the flow of natural streams within the San Luis Valley at
a rate considerably greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual
rate of withdrawal. The Court rejected the argument that faulting would
diminish the effects of the pumping on the adjacent waters. It also made
specific, factual findings that surface streams in the Closed Basin area are
hydrologically connected to the underlying groundwater. In addition, the
Court found that the groundwater in the unconfined aquifer should be
considered part of the "natural stream" that may not be affected by
nontributary groundwater development.

89. Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-92-302 (1)(b).
90. Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-92-305 (3); Application for Water Rights of Cities of Aurora and
Colorado Springs, In Eagle, Lake and Pitkin Counties 799 P.2d 33, 37 (Colo. 1990).
91. AWDI, supra note 60.
92. J. Hill, The AWDI Trial: Brogden Describes 'Vertical Gradient, Valley Courier (18
October 1991).
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Underlying the AWDI case were fundamental differences of
opinion about the nature of the Valley's hydrology and the effects of
climatic variability on recharge and about the ability of the system to
support groundwater exports on the scale proposed by AWDL Hydrologic modeling of the system is a relatively recent endeavor, and much
uncertainty remains about the nature of the confined aquifer, its
hydrologic connections to the overlying unconfined aquifer and surface
waters (including the Rio Grande), its sources of recharge and their
interannual variability. Uncertainty and disagreement also remain about
the potential impact of the proposed project on the Valley's wetlands as
well as the role of the confined aquifer in maintaining the geological
stability of the nearby Great Sand Dunes National Monument.
The fact that the hydrology of the system is complicated and
poorly understood suggests that the cost of measuring the true impacts
of AWDI's water withdrawals on natural ecosystems and on other water
users is not trivial. The measurement problem is further complicated by
the variability of recharge to and discharge from the system. Interannual
variations in precipitation and in the use of surface water and groundwater in the Valley cause fluctuations in the level of the water table in the
unconfined aquifer as well as in the artesian pressure of the confined
aquifer, although these changes are never uniform across the Valley.
Presumably, fluctuations in the Valley's aquifer system, outside of the
Closed Basin, will eventually affect the flow of the Rio Grande River.
Farmers in the Valley argue that the difficulty of determining the
source of variability in the hydrologic system would be the biggest
impediment to AWDIs proposed compensation scheme. As Melvin Getz,
the Secretary-Treasurer of the Rio Grande Water Users Association,
argues:
... if an artesianwell, located on my ranch 50 miles from the project
area quitsflowing five years after AWDI starts pumping the aquifer,
is it due to their pumping or the drought? Who will decide? Will
a computer model, whose output is varied by an operator'sassumptions, make the decision?"3
Holders of vested water rights are not the only interests that can
potentially be damaged by the AWDI project. Local business owners and
residents of the Valley's small towns as well as several environmental
groups were among the most vocal opponents to the project. The
business owners and townspeople apparently believe that the export of

93. M. Getz, San Luis Valley Shoumown:

A Local Resident's Perspective, Water Court

Reporter (University of Denver College of Law, 1 December 1990).
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water from the Valley would reduce agricultural activity and tourism,
causing their incomes to fall.
AWDI made gome conciliatory offers in an attempt to garner the
good will of Valley residents. In addition to the terms of AWDI's
amended application, the company proposed to invest in a local
development program that would keep part of the project's water, and
part of its increased economic value, in the San Luis Valley." Although
some local residents were willing to participate, the development
program and the amended application apparently did little to quell
opposition to the project."
LESSONS FROM THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Why did AWDI's proposed project generate so much costly
contention? Existing groundwater pumpers and the other objectors in
the case obviously felt that their interests would be seriously damaged if
the water court allowed the project to proceed. The theoretical perspectives outlined above suggest that this perceived vulnerability arises from
the nature of the groundwater resource and from the nature of property
rights to the resource, and perhaps to some extent from the identity of
the players. This section examines the possible contributions and
shortcomings of these various theoretical approaches in contributing to
an understanding of the San Luis Valley case.
This case suggests that the difficulty of establishing and enforcing
property rights to the Valley's groundwater derives largely from the
nature of the resource. In groundwater basins in general, the inherent
interconnections between users and the cost of accurately measuring the
variable characteristics of the resource create obstacles to the complete
specification and enforcement of groundwater rights. Thus the nature of
the resource affects the costs of defining, monitoring and enforcing
individual rights. In turn, these costs affect the structure, behavior and
course of development of institutions governing groundwater use. Where
groundwater rights are incompletely defined and enforced, increasing
demand for the resource or other changes in circumstances may lead to
conflicts.
The growing potential value of the San Luis Valley's groundwater
to urban users along Colorado's Front Range led AWDI to attempt to
establish rights to a portion of the resource that the company views as
unowned and available for capture. That attempt resulted in a costly

94. D. Foster, Valley Water Plan Reduced: Company Vows to Take Less from San Luis, Rocky
Mountain News (21 August 1990); see also Foster, supra note 3.
95. D. Foster, Reduced San Luis Valley Water Plan Still Opposed, Rocky Mountain News (1
September 1990); see also Foster, supra note 3.
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dispute. While no exact figures are available, it is widely believed that
parties on both sides spent several million dollars for legal fees,
hydrologic studies and the gathering and dissemination of other types of
information. While some of this activity generated valuable information,
a substantial portion of these expenditures probably served to dissipate
the potential value of the Valley's water resources.
Theorists working from the optimal control perspective would
tend to view this dissipation of value as evidence of institutional
inadequacy. Adherents to this perspective might argue that this dispute
could have been avoided. Instead, mutually beneficial water transfers or
a negotiated entry fee could have been arranged if only the property
rights of existing users of the resource had been better defined and
enforced.
The optimal control perspective does not directly address
questions of institutional change, but rather tends to view the definition
and allocation of property rights as exogenously determined, perhaps by
government fiat, and stable once chosen. While theorists basing their
work on optimal control make some effort to explain the existence of
particular property rights institutions, they primarily focus on the effects
of such institutions rather than on their origins and evolution.
Adherents to the transaction cost perspective would likely
question the argument that property rights to the San Luis Valley's
groundwater should have been better defined in advance in order to
avert such costly disputes. To them, the lack of property rights which
previously were sufficiently well defined to prevent the value-dissipating
conflict over AWDI's proposal provides evidence that prior to the
controversy, water users did not expect to gain from further investment
of resources in clarifying and enforcing the dimensions of individual
groundwater rights. Indeed, the Valley's water users apparently believed
that the State Engineer's policy of denying permits for new large capacity
wells had effectively closed the Valley's aquifer system to new appropriation. This, together with expected completion of the Closed Basin
Project' and a fortuitous series of wet years that had eliminated
Colorado's accumulated water debt to the downstream states" seemed
to promise new stability and security to the Valley's water users. For
their own purposes, the Valley's water users may have viewed the

96. The recently completed Closed Basin Project is intended to pump as much as 117,000
acre-feet (144 x 10' i 3) annually into the Rio Grande River in order to assist Colorado in
meeting its Rio Grande Compact obligations to New Mexico and Texas.
97. Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico received enough inflow to necessitate a spill
in 1985. Under the terms of the U.S. Supreme Court Stipulation governing repayment of
Colorado's water debt (supra note 84), the spill was sufficient to eliminate the debt (supra
note 5).
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existing system of unquantified groundwater use rights, relatively
unmonitored withdrawals and little available hydrologic information as
reasonably adequate.
AWDI's proposal, however, abruptly disrupted the tenuous
equilibrium established in the Valley. Since questions of water rights are
settled in Colorado by the state's system of water courts rather than by
the State Engineer, the policy of denying new well permits provided
existing users with little protection against an applicant with substantial
financial resources. The transaction cost perspective predicts that when
the potential value of a resource increases, greater efforts will be devoted
to attempting to capture that new value. Not only may new entrants like
AWDI attempt to assert a claim, but existing users can be expected to
increase their efforts to protect or expand their own rights. The San Luis
Valley case appears to be an example of this competitive process.
The transaction cost theorists see property rights as determined
endogenously and continuously. Rights are determined by a constant
interplay of the efforts of nominal owners of assets, with the assistance
of public institutions, to exercise and enforce their rights against the
efforts of other parties to capture the value of those assets. Costly
disputes are predicted to arise, under particular conditions, when there
is sufficient increase in the potential value of the resource. Therefore,
such disputes contribute to the process by which property rights are
defined and enforced. In the San Luis Valley case, the opposition of
irrigators, environmentalists and small town interests to AWDI's
proposed project arises from the fact that they cannot have completely
secure rights to the water resources whose services they now enjoy,
making the value of these.services vulnerable to capture. This insecurity
is evidenced by the fact that these parties are incurring considerable
expense to defend their interests against the possible impacts of the
AWDI project. Their actions have substantially increased the cost to
AWDI of establishing the proposed new property right. These combined
costs entail some dissipation of the potential gains from this project.
While the transaction cost perspective outlines a theory of the
evolution of property institutions in response to changing conditions,
Ostrom's work attempts to put empirical flesh on that outline as it
pertains to common property resources. Her work also more carefully
defines and documents important interactions between different levels of
decision making. Of particular relevance for the San Luis Valley case is
the importance that she attaches to the presence or absence of local
rule-making authority. From Ostrom's perspective, the situation in the
San Luis Valley would likely be viewed as a case of institutional fragility.
The temporary and uncertain balance that the Valley's water users had
achieved between groundwater withdrawals, surface water use and the
water rights of downstream parties was vulnerable to disruption by
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AWDI's proposal. Ostrom would predict value-dissipating conflicts to be
quite likely in a setting like Colorado's San Luis Valley where there is
little local rule-making authority over groundwater use and where water
rights decisions are made primarily by the courts. While this system
ostensibly protects vested water rights, it may oblige the holders of those
rights to incur considerable costs in their defense. It may also place
barriers in the way of creative local solutions to groundwater problems
by making it more difficult to use local democratic processes to create
rules governing groundwater use. Since the current community of
groundwater users does not have clear authority to exclude outsiders
such as AWDI, and since no mechanisms are in place for the local
development and enforcement of rules governing groundwater use, the
principles that Ostrom identified as characterizing robust self-governance
institutions are missing in the San Luis Valley.
Theorists from all three perspectives see the nature of the
resource as an important source of difficulty. However, adherents to the
optimal control perspective assume that the characteristics of the resource
are relatively well known and agreed upon by all users. Where there is
uncertainty about such factors as variable recharge rates and the total
volume of water in storage, the optimal control theorists implicitly
assume that users nonetheless agree regarding the probability distributions for these factors and that the objective truth can eventually be
discovered at relatively low cost. Such assumptions are highly questionable for the San Luis Valley case.
Indeed, it is precisely the type of physical data required for
privatization as envisioned by Anderson et al." that is the subject of the
San Luis Valley dispute. Therefore, the optimal control perspective does
not address the problems underlying the San Luis Valley conflict. There,
the fight is over how a resource of relatively unknown dimensions should
be apportioned among current and potential future users in an environment where it may be extremely difficult to determine the actual effects
of the proposed use on parties with an existing stake in the resource.
The transaction cost perspective provides an explanation of the
rejection of AWDI's proposed compensation plan by owners of existing
wells. It suggests that their skepticism rests on an understanding that
measurement of true impacts in the presence of natural variability may
be prohibitively costly. Given this problem, current water users distrust
AWDI's compensation offer since they have no guarantee that their
claims for compensation will go unchallenged. On the other hand, given
costly measurement, it is also possible that AWDI might compensate
existing users even if they are not truly harmed.

98. Anderson et al., supra note 16.
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Ostrom's work contributes the further insight that since AWDI's
investors and corporate officers are outsiders to the Valley's farming
community, there are no ongoing ties of mutual interdependence nor
shared behavioral norms that tend to guarantee promises and lower
enforcement costs. Therefore, the fundamental mistrust of AWDI and its
promises apparent among Valley residents evidences a problem likely to
be encountered whenever representatives of urban interests enter rural
areas in search of additional water supplies."
The transaction cost perspective predicts that individuals will
attempt to devise institutions and contractual arrangements that will
minimize the dissipation resulting from competing efforts to capture the
value of scarce assets. However, such efforts are somewhat difficult to
identify in the San Luis Valley case, although AWDI's offer to compensate other well owners and invest in a local development program might
constitute an attempt to reduce opposition and thus lower the cost of
securing the right to proceed. The company apparently viewed its
proposed local development program as an offer to share part of the
gains from the project with the Valley's residents. To the extent that
AWDI's proposal would entail a sharing of the net social gains, it would
exceed the requirements of Colorado's "no injury" rule. The fact that
AWDI believes that such an offer might be the least costly way to achieve
its objective suggests that the anticipated gains from the project are also,
to some extent, vulnerable to capture by other parties.
Further efforts to reduce dissipation of value may become evident
in the future as the Valley's water users and state officials use the
experience gained from the recent dispute, as well as the newly generated
body of hydrologic information, to address the potential effects of future
water development proposals. The case has already resulted in a
proposed state constitutional amendment aimed at enhancing the
authority of local water conservancy districts to restrict water transfers.'re The particular proposal under consideration appears to be a
rather blunt instrument that may be unnecessarily restrictive to water
transfers. By giving conservancy districts only a yes or no choice over
99. In another recent case, farmers in the Arkansas River Valley of southeastern Colorado
spurned a $120 million offer for controlling interest in a ditch company that supplies
irrigation water in two counties. The offer came from a company that sought to resell its
share of the water to Front Range cities. Farmers were suspicious of the offer, fearing both
direct and indirect impacts of selling their water. See D. Frazier, Farmers Face a Flood of
Problems in Selling their Water, Rocky Mountain News (17 February 1992).
100. J. Stern, Pastore Bill to Govern Water Transfers, Valley Voice (August 1991). Senator
Pastore has eliminated several ambiguities in the language of the proposed amendment and
now intends to bring the revised version before the state's voters in 1994. See N. McMahon,
Amendment opinions vary in Valley, state, Special Report: SLV Water, supplement to the
Alamosa News, October 1992.
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proposed water transfers rather than full authority to negotiate compensation for damages, the proposed amendment could prevent net socially
beneficial transfers. Furthermore, by not allowing conservancy districts
to determine the aggregate level of groundwater demand and to negotiate
entry fees with new users as suggested by Gisser,1°' the amendment
could impair rather than improve the allocation of Colorado's water
resources.
In addition, it should be noted that neither Gisser's proposal nor
the proposed amendment to Colorado's state constitution gives any
recognition or voice to parties whose interest in the aquifer is unrelated
to their own extraction of groundwater. The desire of environmental
interests and state and federal authorities to prevent damage to wetlands
and the Great Sand Dunes National Monument, for example, have played
an important role in the San Luis Valley case. Such diverse interests are
not addressed by the proposed constitutional amendment and it is not
readily apparent how they could be accommodated within privatization
schemes such as proposed by Anderson et al. or Gisser.
CONCLUSION
As we reach the limits of developable surface water supplies in
many areas of the West, groundwater development is becoming
increasingly attractive to meet new demands. This trend is illustrated by
the efforts of the city of Las Vegas to claim groundwater in rural areas of
Nevada," 2 purchases of rural lands by Arizona cities to obtain groundwater rights," and the proposed AWDI development in the San Luis
Valley. In each case substantial disputes have arisen, highlighting
inadequacies in existing institutional arrangements for groundwater
development.
Proponents of privatization have suggested that these disputes
could be avoided by creating better defined private property rights to use
groundwater.""' By making explicit the protectable extent of the right,
it is asserted, any additional development could occur only in a manner
that would not measurably diminish existing rights. Moreover, such well
defined rights would be easily transferable, thereby helping to assure that
water uses can change as necessary to meet new needs.

101. Gisser, supra note 28.
102. J.Christensen, Will Las Vegas Drain Rural Nevada?, 22 High Country News (21 May

1990).
103. G. Woodard & C. McCarthy, Water Transfers in Arizona, in The Water Transfer
Process As a Management Option for Meeting Changing Water Demands (Vol. II, Natural
Resources Law Center, University of Colorado, 1990).
104. Anderson el al., supra note 16 at 228-229; Gisser, supra note 28 at 1026-1027.
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The proposed large-scale groundwater development in the San
Luis Valley, however, illustrates the shortcomings of a simplistic private
property rights solution. The hydrologic system in the San Luis Valley is
highly complex and little is known about some of the aquifer's characteristics. Critical factors such as the manner and -amount of recharge,
climate-related variability, and interactions between groundwater and
surface water are also poorly understood. This creates difficulties for the
mathematical simulation of the effects of groundwater withdrawals.
Moreover, not all uses of groundwater are private or direct. In the San
Luis Valley there was considerable concern about the wetlands that
depend on groundwater for their existence. Furthermore, some believe
that the spectacular 800 foot sand dunes protected in the Great Sand
Dunes National Monument depend on groundwater tables underlying the
area. In addition, the possibility that groundwater development would
reduce flows in the Rio Grande raises the further issue of interstate
compact obligations to New Mexico and Texas.
Transaction cost economists caution against assuming that
property rights are, or should be, completely defined. The importance of
defining these rights depends on the value to be gained in relation to the
costs entailed by the definition process. The transaction costs associated
with better defining water rights are substantial in complex situations
such as in the San Luis Valley. This perspective suggests an incremental
approach to the definition of groundwater rights based on the net
benefits that result.
The institutional challenge is to facilitate this incremental
approach in a manner that encourages maximization of benefits, net of
transaction costs, for all of the affected interests. The Ostrom approach
suggests that this result can best be accomplished through direct,
interactive participation by the interested parties themselves. Her work,
however, also indicates the difficulties of this approach in complex
settings such as that represented by the San Luis Valley.
Groundwater laws and institutions will change and develop in
response to increasing demands. They should also develop along with a
better understanding of the resource itself. Early legal notions of absolute
ownership of groundwater derived from ignorance of the effects of
groundwater withdrawals. Rules for allocation subsequently evolved to
reduce the most serious weaknesses of the earlier legal approach. The
clear trend has been to limit and better define the withdrawal right and
to clarify the protection that right enjoys in relation to other users and
uses. Such efforts will be further prompted by additional interest in
groundwater development. These efforts should be guided by an
awareness of the potentially broad range of interests implicated by
large-scale groundwater development and by a comparison of the benefits
in relation to the transaction costs involved.

